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That’s partly due to the government increasing the defence budget (again, largely due to China), with much of that flowing into the acquisition budget. Now Defence has the opposite problem: it’s got too much cash. And with Defence’s acquisition program historically oversubscribed, that would have had a ripple effect of further delays on other programs. Buying a replacement for the MRH-90 would have meant deferring or cancelling another priority. Defence can’t do that each year it has to live within its means. A private company could manage that by borrowing and paying it back with the operating savings (or the revenue raised by operating the new asset). A key reason that the government and Defence hadn’t replaced the MRH-90 is that, even though there would have been long-term savings through the lower operating cost of the Black Hawk, there would have been a big short-term acquisition cost.
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The third way is that Defence is suddenly rich in cash-and that’s also because of China. The second way is that the new strategic climate means there’s more willingness to accept the poor optics of retiring a $3.5 billion investment early-just as the government was willing to accept what will likely be a sunk cost of more than $3 billion once all is said and done in the cancelled Attack-class program.